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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 15-1054 
____________ 
 
DAWN GUIDOTTI, on behalf of herself and all other class members similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
LEGAL HELPERS DEBT RESOLUTION, L.L.C. also known as The Law Firm of 
Macey, Aleman, Hyslip and Searns; ECLIPSE SERVICING INC, formerly known as 
Eclipse Financial, Inc.; GLOBAL CLIENT SOLUTIONS, L.L.C.; LEGAL SERVICES 
SUPPORT GROUP, L.L.C.; JG DEBT SOLUTIONS, L.L.C.; ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
BANK AND TRUST  OF COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO; LYNCH 
FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS, INC., trading as Financial Solutions Legal Center or 
Financial Solutions Consumer Center or Financial Solutions Processing Center; JEM 
GROUP, INC.; CENTURY MITIGATIONS, L.P.; LEGAL HELPERS, P.C., trading as 
The Law Firm of Macey and Aleman; THOMAS G. MACEY; JEFFREY J. ALEMAN; 
JASON E. SEARNS; JEFFREY HYSLIP; THOMAS M. NICELY; JOEL GAVALAS; 
AMBER N. DUNCAN;  HARRY HEDAYA; DOUGLAS L. MCCLURE; MICHAEL 
HENDRIX; JOHN DOE(S) 1-1000; JIM DOE(S) 1-1000; TOM DOE(S) 1-1000, the said 
names of John Doe(s),  Jim Doe(s) and Tom Doe(s) being fictitious; STEPHEN CHAYA; 
RELIANT ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT, L.L.C. 
 
     Global Client Solutions, LLC; Rocky Mountain Bank and Trust, 
                                                                                              Appellants 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 1-11-cv-01219) 
District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
____________ 
 
Argued January 21, 2016 
 
Before:  JORDAN, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges. 
(Filed:  February 10, 2016) 
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Joseph M. Pinto [Argued] 
Polino and Pinto 
720 East Main Street, Suite 1C 
Moorestown, NJ 08057 
 Counsel for Appellee 
 
John H. Pelzer [Argued] 
Greenspoon Marder 
200 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 1800 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 
 
 Counsel for Appellants 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Global Client Solutions, LLC and Rocky Mountain Bank and Trust (RMBT) 
appeal the District Court’s order denying their motion to compel arbitration of a putative 
class action filed by Dawn Guidotti. For the reasons that follow, we will vacate and 
remand for further proceedings.  
I 
 Guidotti sued Global, RMBT, and twenty other named defendants in New Jersey 
Superior Court asserting claims under the state’s Consumer Fraud Act, Debt Adjustment 
and Credit Counseling Act, civil racketeering statutes, and various common law causes of 
action. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8-19, 17:16G-8, and 2C:41-4. Guidotti’s complaint 
                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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alleged that the defendants conspired to defraud her by promising to reduce her 
unsecured consumer debt by negotiating with her creditors, and then draining her of her 
remaining assets without engaging in any negotiations. Global and RMBT’s role in the 
alleged conspiracy was to operate a bank account into which Guidotti made monthly 
payments and from which the defendants extracted their fees. To open this account, 
Guidotti was obliged to execute an agreement with Global and RMBT, two documents of 
which are at issue in this appeal: (1) the Special Purpose Account Application (SPAA); 
and (2) the Account Agreement and Disclosure Statement (AADS).  
 After removing the case to the District Court, the defendants filed six parallel 
motions seeking either to dismiss Guidotti’s lawsuit or to compel arbitration. Global and 
RMBT jointly moved to compel based on an arbitration clause contained in the AADS, 
but not in the SPAA. Guidotti opposed the motion by denying that she had received the 
AADS at the time she executed the SPAA, and that the AADS was otherwise 
insufficiently incorporated into the SPAA as a matter of New Jersey contract law. The 
District Court agreed with her and denied Global and RMBT’s motion. See Guidotti v. 
Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 866 F. Supp. 2d 315, 332–36 (D.N.J. 2011).  
 Global and RMBT appealed, which led to our opinion in Guidotti v. Legal Helpers 
Debt Resolution, L.L.C. (Guidotti I), 716 F.3d 764 (3d Cir. 2013). In Guidotti I, we 
remanded the case after clarifying the standard for deciding motions to compel 
arbitration. 716 F.3d at 780. Under our newly clarified standard, and given the existence 
of issues of material fact: 
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[T]he District Court should not have denied [Global and RMBT’s] motion 
to compel arbitration without first allowing limited discovery and then 
entertaining their motion under a summary judgment standard. If, after 
presentation of the evidence uncovered during discovery, a genuine dispute 
of material fact remained, the Court then should have submitted to a jury (if 
either party demanded one) the factual question of whether Guidotti was 
aware of the arbitration clause in the [AADS] at the time she signed and 
submitted the SPAA. 
Id.  
 On remand, the District Court gave the parties seven months to develop the facts 
underlying Guidotti’s purported agreement with Global and RMBT. It then denied the 
defendants’ motion to compel arbitration once again. The Court found that despite 
discovery, “genuine issues of fact clearly persist concerning whether [Guidotti] had the 
AADS at the time she signed the SPAA, and it is axiomatic that an agreement cannot be 
found properly incorporated, if [its] provisions . . . are not known by the party to be 
bound at the time of acknowledgment.” App. 23. Alternatively, assuming that Guidotti 
had received the AADS, the District Court held that the arbitration clause was 
unenforceable either as (1) an insufficiently clear waiver of Guidotti’s statutory right to 
sue in court under the rule announced by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Atalese v. 
U.S. Legal Services Group L.P., 99 A.3d 306, 316 (N.J. 2014); or (2) unconscionably 
one-sided under New Jersey law because it arrogated both the choice of arbitral forum 
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and the choice of arbitrator to Global and RMBT’s discretion. Global and RMBT 
appealed the District Court’s order.1 
II 
 In Guidotti I, we established the following standard for district courts to apply 
when deciding motions to compel arbitration:  
[W]hen it is apparent, based on the face of a complaint, and documents 
relied upon in the complaint, that certain of a party’s claims are subject to 
an enforceable arbitration clause, a motion to compel arbitration should be 
considered under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard without discovery’s delay. But if 
the complaint and its supporting documents are unclear regarding the 
agreement to arbitrate, or if the plaintiff has responded to a motion to 
compel arbitration with additional facts sufficient to place the agreement to 
arbitrate in issue, then the parties should be entitled to discovery on the 
question of arbitrability before a court entertains further briefing on [the] 
question. After limited discovery, the court may entertain a renewed motion 
to compel arbitration, this time judging the motion under a summary 
judgment standard. In the event that summary judgment is not warranted 
because the party opposing arbitration can demonstrate, by means of 
citations to the record, that there is a genuine dispute as to the 
enforceability of the arbitration clause, the court may then proceed 
summarily to a trial regarding the making of the arbitration agreement or 
the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same. 
716 F.3d at 776 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added) 
(second alteration in original).  
                                                 
 1 Because Guidotti’s complaint sought class-action certification, alleged more than 
$5,000,000 in controversy, and satisfied minimal diversity of citizenship, the District 
Court had jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). We 
have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of Global and RMBT’s motion to 
compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B). “We 
exercise plenary review over questions regarding the validity and enforceability of an 
agreement to arbitrate.” Guidotti I, 716 F.3d at 772 (quoting Puleo v. Chase Bank N.A., 
605 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc)). 
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 On remand from Guidotti I, the District Court did not adjudicate the first issue 
because “genuine issues of fact clearly persist concerning whether [Guidotti] had the 
AADS at the time she signed the SPAA.” App. 23. Instead of resolving the parties’ 
factual dispute by proceeding summarily to trial, the Court held that the AADS’s 
arbitration clause was unenforceable as a matter of state law under both Atalese and New 
Jersey’s doctrine of unconscionability. 
 Whether these state law grounds remain viable as not preempted by the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 2, presents an important and challenging question. See 
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308–09 (2013); AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746–48 (2011). But the resolution of this 
question is unnecessary if Guidotti never received the AADS or otherwise failed to assent 
to arbitrate her claims. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order denying 
Global and RMBT’s motion and remand with instructions to resolve this factual dispute. 
 If on remand the District Court or a jury should determine after appropriate fact 
finding that the parties formed an agreement to arbitrate, the question of whether Atalese 
and the Court’s application of New Jersey’s doctrine of unconscionability are preempted 
by the FAA will squarely present itself for our resolution. As it stands, however, 
“prudence counsels in favor of declining to consider a question whose resolution either 
will prove unnecessary to a final disposition, or, if necessary, will inevitably be before us 
again, none the worse for the delay.” Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 552–
53 (3d Cir. 1981). 
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* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we will vacate the District Court’s order denying Global 
and RMBT’s motion to compel arbitration and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
